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Abstract 
In this paper, we propose a dualist view that economics exhibits the properties of 
both moral science and value-neutral approach, regardless of the normative-positive 
distinction. Our argumentation is derived from the understanding that, analytically, 
economics is a rational choice theory, broadly defined. As implied by this claim, on 
the one hand, economics behaves as a moral science for two main reasons: all 
economic theories and policy discussions are necessarily based on some moral 
premises about means-end considerations; economics as a method of analysis can be 
and has been applied to explanations of a wide range of moral phenomena. On the 
other hand, since economists — without being informed of some ethical 
presuppositions of higher order — cannot deal with the comparisons among different 
value criteria, their approach remains neutral regarding judgmental positions, which 
should be given a priori to make economic enquiries possible. Ultimately, by this 
view we reconcile morality with value neutrality, without slicing the discipline into 
two branches. 
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1. Introduction 
Amartya Sen, a Nobel economist and an influential moral philosopher, once 
argued that economics has two different origins: one is “ethics-related,” and another is 
“engineering-based” (Sen,1987, p.6). Although Sen’s argument remains debatable, it 
is hard to deny that both ethics and engineering approach contributed significantly to 
the birth of the so-called “dismal science.” More important, the mixed origin of 
economics, which brings about the constant intertwinement between morality and 
value neutrality in the discipline, casts doubts and vagueness on its identity: Is 
economics a branch of moral science or a mere engineering-based technique? Or, can 
it be both of them? Relatedly, how do the two sources of genes, ethics and 
engineering, coexist in the very body? Can morality and value neutrality be reconciled 
with each other? If yes, in which way? Those fundamental questions go back at least 
to the very beginning of modern economics, which was founded by another moral 
philosopher, Adam Smith, some 250 years ago, and continue to be debated among 
scholars from multiple disciplines today. 
To a large extent, the traditional perspective developed by, inter alia, Pantaleoni 
(1889), J. N. Keynes(1917), Robbins(1935), Samuelson (1947), and Friedman(1953), 
still dominates not just the discussions on the above questions, but also economics 
research and teaching in general. To summarize, this perspective is an attempt to 
single out the ethics-related component from the rest of the discipline to obtain “pure 
economics,” or “science of economics,” or “positive economics,” which only pertains 
to “is” and “facts,” and thus is free of moral considerations. Then, the ethical “residue” 
was walled in the field of “art of economics,” or “normative economics,” or “welfare 
economics,” which pertains to “should” and “values” (also see Colander, 2009). 
Although acknowledging the importance of both morality and value neutrality in 
economics, the above authors laid emphasis on the facts/values or positive/normative 
distinction. For instance, having stressed “(t)he problem whether political economy is 
to be regarded as a positive science, or as a normative science, or as an art, or as a 
combination of these,” J. N. Keynes lamented that “(c)onfusion between them is 
common and has been the source of many mischievous errors” (1917, p35). Also, as 
Robbins made it even clearer (1935, p.148), “…it does not seem logically possible to 
associate the two studies in any form but mere juxtaposition. Economics deals with 
ascertainable facts; ethics with valuations and obligations. The two fields of enquiry 
are not on the same plane of discourse.” At one level, their argument can be labelled 
as a somewhat “pseudo dualist view” that morality and value neutrality are merely 
juxtaposed in two distinctive branches of economics.  
Nonetheless, with little attention to how economists explain their subject matter 
and how they prescribe policies for the real world, such a perspective is, at best, 
unhelpful for dealing with the topic under discussion. Instead, in this paper we 
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propose an alternative dualist view that economics behaves both as a moral science 
and a value-neutral approach, irrespective of the aforementioned twofold distinction2. 
This argument is directly implied by our understanding that analytically, economics is 
based on the principle of means-end rationality, taken in its broader sense. It turns out 
that holding this principle is a common, but often unspoken and thus forgotten 
property underlying all approaches relying on the economic way of thinking − from 
the neoclassical school to behavioral economics – regardless of how they differ in the 
concrete empirical counterparts of the “means” and “end.” Thanks to this 
methodological heartland, our dualist view can be briefly summarized as follows: On 
the one hand, economics exhibits the property of a moral science. It is not just 
because all theorizing and policy discussions in economics are necessarily based on 
certain moral premises with respect to means and end, but also because economics as 
a rational choice theory of human behavior has been applied to address a wide range 
of moral questions. On the other hand, economics also behaves as an engineering-like 
approach. It is because without certain ethical presuppositions toward which a specific 
economics research project remains neutral, economists cannot do their job, and, in 
particular, they have no relevant expertise to deal with the comparisons and choices 
among different value criteria and moral norms, which are assumed to be justified as 
ends for their own sake.  
Apparently, our dualist view appears to share some consistency with the 
“entanglement view” developed by H. Putnam and his coauthor V. Walsh (Putnam, 
2002, Putnam and Walsh, 2007 and 2009). According to them, economics is entangled 
throughout with values and thus the so-called welfare economics, a branch carrying 
“an ineradicable taint of values” (Putnam and Walsh, 2009, p.291), cannot be 
separated from the rest of the discipline. Although it seems that this position may also 
lead to the inseparability of the moral and value-neutral facets of economics, their 
view has been established from without: it relies principally on the entanglement of 
facts/values/theory in a generic sense, with special attention to the “epistemic values” 
such as “coherence,” “plausibility,” and “reasonableness”(Putnam, 2002, Chapter 2), 
rather than “non-epistemic values” or “ethical values.”3 By contrast, in this paper we 
take a within perspective — namely addressing the dual identity of economics by 
mainly, if not exclusively, examining the analytical feature of the very discipline. In 
addition, since our focus is on the implications of the rationality principle for 
economic enquires, it is with non-epistemic values or ethical values that the current 
                                                        
2 Accordingly, it also implies that even we put aside the question of whether the positive and the normative can be 
sharply distinguished (see Hands, 2012), our dualist view still holds true.  
3 More specifically, as pointed out in Scarantino (2009), epistemic values refer to “accuracy, consistency, scope, 
simplicity, and fruitfulness”(P.465), and are crucial for pursuing scientific knowledge of all disciplines; 
non-epistemic values contain “all sorts of personal, ethical, political, and socio-cultural values” (p.465). Notably, 
in this paper we do not enter into the debate about the distinction between the two sorts of values, which has no 
direct relevance to our main thesis. 
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paper is principally concerned. To a lesser extent, our study will also touch upon 
epistemic values in economics, but in a different way from Putnam and Walsh’s 
argumentation.4 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the means-end 
rationality principle which is fundamental to revealing the dual identity of economics. 
Section 3 turns to the distinction of normative/positive economics – a common but 
misleading perspective addressing how morality and value neutrality are related in the 
discipline. Section 4 focuses on the moral dimension of economics, and explores how 
ethical principles guide economics and how economics, in turn, contributes to 
understanding ethical issues. Section 5 considers the engineering dimension of 
economics, and shows that the discipline remains neural regarding different 
judgmental positions in the sense that certain kinds of moral premises and value 
criteria should be given prior to economic enquiries. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Rationality principle and economic enquires 
Although Robbins’ main focus may be on the “science of economics” which is 
free from ethical considerations (see Colander, 2009), his well-known analytical 
definition of economics can still serve as the foundation for our understanding on 
rationality. According to the LSE economist, economic enquiries are essentially 
concerned with how the available means can be allocated to achieve the end that is 
given a priori (Robbins, 1935, p.16)5. In other words, economics is a study about the 
aspect of human behavior that can be read as an outcome of means-end consideration. 
In much the same spirit, Becker (1976) later argued that the maximizing behavior, 
along with other assumptions, forms “the heart of the economic approach” (p.4), 
thereby proposing a definition of economics equally based on its method of analysis. 
Of course, there are also many others who define economics differently, such as 
focusing on subject-matter instead of on method6, they are indeed not fundamentally 
at odds with Robbins and Becker’s emphasis on the analytical feature of economics: 
even if economists may only give attention to some particular classes of social 
                                                        
4 In a similar vein, Dupré (2007) also asserts that because scientific enterprise, including economics, matters for 
human beings, it is hard to draw a dichotomy between facts and values. Although having addressed some 
economics concepts, such as “inflation” and “work,” in Dupré’s argument the analytical feature of economics is 
still left untouched and the value-laden nature of economics is viewed as a special case of the generic 
non-distinction of facts and values.     
5 In his original text, Robbins (1935) uses the plural “ends” rather than the singular “end.” However, in a specific 
research project, economists cannot deal with several ends without additional information/assumptions, unless they 
are intermediary or instrumental ends that can be measured by some common metric, to achieve an ultimate end.  
6 For example, classical theorist Jean-Baptiste Say (1832, p.9) defined “political economy” as a science that 
“unfolds the manner in which wealth is produced, distributed, and consumed;” as one of the founders of 
neoclassical economics, Alfred Marshall began his masterpiece textbook by asserting “political economy or 
economics is a study of mankind in the ordinary business of life” (1920, p.1); institutional economists such as 
Buchanan (1964) and Coase (1978) place emphasis on the market system and related institutional arrangements as 
the subject-matter by which economics should be defined. Since the debate about the definitions of economics is 
beyond the scope of this paper, interested readers are referred to Kirzner (1960, Chapter 1), and Backhouse and 
Medema (2009) for further discussions.  
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phenomenon and human behavior, they still rely on a special cognitive instrument or 
perspective, which is nothing but the economic way of thinking. The latter, by 
common understanding, is self-evidently founded on the principle of means-end 
rationality7. In particular, once we stretch the connotation of the terms “means” and 
“end” to accommodate various alleged behavioral anomalies and other nonmaterial 
concerns, the principle of rationality is shared, explicitly or implicitly, with all 
economic approaches and schools of thought, as long as they do not abandon the 
economic way of thinking when enquiring into human choices and trade-offs.  
With this understanding in mind, it turns out that economics is a broadly defined 
rational choice theory, which can be applied to production/distribution/consumption 
of wealth, or to exchanges and market system, or to others. Although one may argue 
about the latter, namely the subject-matter of economics (see Footnote 6), theorizing 
upon the rationality principle remains an integral feature of economic analysis. Here, 
the term “rational” – being a major source of confusion – should be taken in its 
broader sense. It by no means implies that economic agents always make the right 
choice that leads to the highest level of material satisfaction. In reality, of course, 
people often make the so-called “non-optimal” decisions due to some constraints on 
the one hand, and also pursue non-material satisfaction on the other. Instead, the term 
“rational” merely means that from an economic point of view, all human actions and 
choices are perceived as the outcomes of certain kinds of means-end reasoning, and 
thus, are explained in this way. At this point, unlike what is commonly but wrongly 
believed (see Schumpeter, 1934, and Popper, 1985), the rationality principle in its 
broader sense is not an approximation to reality (whether it is a good or bad one), but 
instead, – to use Kant’s terminology – the a priori form of intuition which makes 
economic explanations possible and further defines the epistemological limitations of 
the discipline8. To put it differently, “rational” in the above sense is just a synonym of 
“explainable,” and accordingly, from an economic point of view, “explain” is 
equivalent to “rationalize.” As a logical outcome of this claim, economic explanations 
can only be provided for “rational” phenomena. For example, to explain why some 
investors lose money, all economists can do and need to do is to deal with the 
following two questions: do they seek something other than profit, such as social 
justice, wellbeing of others, and so forth? Are they subjected to some constraints, such 
as information, cognitive capacity, willpower, and moral commitment, which result in 
financially non-optimal decisions? On this view, even in the case described by Sen 
that “(if) a person does exactly the opposite of what would help achieving what he or 
                                                        
7 Since other disciplines, such as sociology, psychology, and biology, may also rest on some versions of the 
rationality principle, the way of thinking based on rationality principle does not offer a sufficient condition to 
define economics. 
8 Arguably, this can be analogized to the argument that to think about “extension,” we need the notion of “space,” 
whereas the latter cannot be considered as an approximation to reality.   
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she want to achieve” (Sen, 1987, p.13), through the lens of economists the behavior of 
this person remains still rational, or, has rational aspect, in the sense that there are 
some factors either in his/her utility function or in the set of constraints that outside 
observers (perhaps including the decision maker under consideration) do not see. It is 
not a matter of fact, but a matter of logic!   
Unfortunately, the above logic may be so obvious that economists do not notice 
it anymore, especially when they are deceived by the very different empirical contents 
of the means and end. In particular, it is not uncommon to equate Robbins’ definition 
with neoclassical economics, which bears essentially on self-material interests and 
resource/technique constraints. For example, as a leading philosopher of economics, 
Daniel Hausman argued, economics as defined by Robbins refers to, in effect, 
neoclassical theory, and thus, it excludes Keynesian theory (Hausman, 2008, p.32). 
Nonetheless, this holds if and only if, at the very beginning, we restrict the means-end 
considerations to those typically taken in neoclassical economics, even though there is 
no logical reason to prevent us from doing differently. Why can we not treat “sense of 
achievement” as a variable affecting the utility of investors? Why can we not consider 
“computational capacity” and “information,” along with “budget,” as constraints to 
which consumers are subject? Why can we not take “fairness” into account when 
exploring the players’ choices, say, in a Ultimatum Game? All these questions are not 
only legitimate, but also reflective of the fundamental approach to human behavior 
that economists use every day, with or more often without their own consciousness. In 
awakening this kind of self-consciousness, we realize that it is Hausman rather than 
Robbins, who excludes non-neoclassical theories from Robbins’ “economics.” 
To further shed light on the status of the rationality principle in economics, we 
next compare two models of theorizing, neoclassical economics and one of its major 
rivals, behavioral economics. As shown in the table below, although both approaches 
significantly differ in what the maximization goals and constraints are considered, 
they can be reduced to an enquiry of the same conceptual scheme, namely constrained 
maximization framework9. As already argued, the latter should be interpreted in its 
broader sense, and thus is not restricted for some specific behavioral assumptions10. It 
should also be emphasized that the empirical contents of neoclassical economics and 
those of behavioral economics do complement, rather than substitute for each other. 
For example, in the real life most individuals are concerned not only with their own 
material interests, but also, to a different extent, with those of others.  
 
 
                                                        
9 From this perspective, perhaps counterintuitively, behavioral economics is but a special version of rational 
choice theory.  
10 At this juncture, it is worth quoting Becker who once wrote, “It [the economic approach] is a method of analysis, 
not an assumption about particular motivations” (Becker, 1996, p.139). 
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Table 1: Neoclassical Economics versus Behavioral Economics  
Items\Approaches Neoclassical Economics Behavioral Economics 
Factors in utility function Self-material interests such as 
consumption, profit, wage, and 
other monetary rewards… 
Moral enjoyment and 
psychological needs such as 
sense of fairness, sympathy for 
others, self-actualization…  
Constraints Budget, production capacity, 
resources, technology… 
Moral commitment, 
information, limits of 
reasoning and computational 
capacity, willpower… 
 
Importantly, discussing how economists explain is not a digression, but instead, a 
key (a forgotten key!), to demystifying the identity of economics. The above 
argumentation indeed helps us know how economic enquiries or explanations have 
been pursued: they necessarily start with some presuppositions about means and end 
involved in human behavior and social phenomena. The moral significance and 
implications, with which these presuppositions are associated, have been put beyond 
question in a specific research project. Although it is perfectly legitimate for 
economists to further question the assumed goals and constraints, this kind of 
endeavor should, again, build on other presuppositions and be addressed in a new 
research agenda. Once we understand the way economic enquires go, our dualist view 
on the identity of economics naturally follows.  
 
3. Twofold division of economics in the light of rationality principle  
Before embarking on the dual identity of economics, we now turn to the twofold 
distinction of economics11, on which the existing discussions about morality and value 
neutrality in economics are usually focused. As will be argued below, without an 
enquiry into the necessary analytical feature of the discipline, both branches of 
economics poorly characterize what economists do in practice on the one hand, and 
since the dual property of the discipline is ingrained throughout its research agenda, 
this dichotomy perspective has no direct relevance to the current topic on the other.   
Let us begin by positive economics, which, for many, constitutes “the more 
prestigious branch of the discipline” (Dupré, 2007, p.35). First, economic enquires, 
such as the mainstream microeconomics, do not typically start with observations of 
agent’s behavior and then generalize those empirical facts to obtain universal and 
necessary laws of human behavior, whereas this is commonly believed as the main 
task of a descriptive science (see Hands, 2012). Second, more important, even 
                                                        
11 See Colander and Su (2015) for a historical review on this topic. 
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economists, especially behavioral economists, base their theory on systematic 
experimental or actual observations, they cannot economically explain or understand 
their findings by merely reporting them. To put differently, from an economic point of 
view, one cannot explain/understand “is” only from “is” itself. Instead, from 
observing “what is” to understanding “why,” they have to rely on some assumptions 
about what economic agents want and what constraints they are subjected to, thereby 
establishing an operational framework of rational choice. For instance, if an 
economist concludes his/her research by showing that there is x percentage of 
responders who reject the offers from the proposers in an Ultimatum Game 
experiment, then what can we understand from this? Perhaps nothing, unless the 
economist continues to rationalize the players’ behavior with the help of constrained 
maximization scheme, which necessarily entails moral judgments and evaluations. 
Even more strikingly, once moving to the step of “why,” positive economics of 
explanation turns out to be a framework for telling what a predefined rational agent 
should do and thus, it is hard to be distinguished from the normative.12  
Indeed, if taking normative economics in this latter sense, then not only the 
twofold division but also the existence of a distinctive normative economics make 
little sense (also see Hands, 2012). For instance, we do not need any analysis to 
investigate what a consumption-maximizer should do, because he/she just should 
maximize consumption, as assumed or defined! With this in mind, in what follows we 
consider normative economics as a policy science which offers prescriptions about 
what should be done to improve the outcomes of human choices and tradeoffs in real 
life.  
Still, as implied by the rationality principle, normative economics in this sense is 
also founded on some presuppositions and thus, strictly speaking, deals with “if …, 
then... should….,” rather than “should” alone. It turns out that this logical formula for 
normative economics of prescription is similar to that for positive economics of 
explanation. The only difference between them lies in what economists do about the 
means-end considerations: when explaining, economists only face the set of means- 
end of the economic agents in question and do not change or intervene in them. When 
prescribing, however, economists face two sets of means-end, or in other words, two 
sets of empirical contents structured under the rationality principle. One is that of the 
economic agents facing decision problems, such as policy makers’ own utility and 
constraints. By the economic way of thinking, economists have to mend it otherwise 
                                                        
12 Unfortunately, many conflate “is” with “why.” For instance, some top behavioral economists, such as Tversky 
and Kahneman (1986), and Thaler (2000) believed that their approach is a positive science about what people 
actually do. It seems that their view is only half right in the sense if their research ends up with fact-finding. It is 
half wrong that when continuing to explain their findings, they have to rely on some normative framework. In 
doing so, they depart from what people actually do, and equally address the question of what a rational agent— in 
a sense different from that in neoclassical economics —should do.    
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their policy prescriptions will logically fail. Another is that involved in policy 
objectives and options, namely the value criteria by which policy arrangements are 
judged and the constraints (including moral obligations) by which some policy 
choices are excluded. Economists do not change or intervene in this set of means-end 
in a specific research project, otherwise they will either go beyond the scope of 
economics, or confront the problem of infinite regress (say, investigating the value of 
value of…etc.). In view of that, normative economics also behaves like an 
engineering approach that remains neutral to the moral concerns regarding this second 
set of presuppositions. 
Without loss of generality, let us consider the following situation. If a policy 
maker chooses Policy I rather than Policy II, the only logically consistent explanation 
for this is that Policy I is the outcome of the policy maker’s maximizing strategy. 
Therefore, if some economists believe that Policy II is better than Policy I to reach the 
goal G (for example, double the economic size of a country in ten years) given the 
constraint set C (for example, reach G without war), they should change the empirical 
counterparts of the policy maker’s utility and constraints insofar as Policy II appears 
as the outcome of the latter’s new maximizing behavior. To do so, economists 
confront two cases which may occur alone or together: (1) The policy maker is 
subject to the information constraint that he/she is unaware of Policy II being a better 
choice. In this case, economists can simply relax the set of constraints of the policy 
maker by informing him/her of Policy II (say, by providing empirical evidence or 
theoretical explanations). It might be a relatively easy task. (2) Although knowing 
Policy II as a better choice, the policy maker does not choose it, because either the 
policy maker is subject to some constraints other than information (say, moral 
obligations), or Policy II would adversely affect his/her own utility. In this second 
case, economists might face a tougher task: they should persuade the policy maker to 
adopt new values and moral positions. Also of importance is that when doing the 
above things, economists have to take the policy goal G and constraint set C as 
necessary givens in the sense that they do not explain nor argue about them. 
Otherwise, no policy analysis can be started or ended. Notably, it is these 
unexplainable or not-yet-explained givens that, to a large extent, bring about major 
disagreements among economists and policy makers on various ethics-related 
economic issues – from taxing the super-rich to stopping environmental dumpling.13 
We summarize our above arguments in Table 2 and conclude this section as 
follows: in the light of the analytical feature of economics, morality and value 
                                                        
13 To some extent, the argument that ethical issues cannot be explained by mere logical reasoning and/or 
fact-finding corresponds to some sorts of non-cognitivist meta-ethical theories, such as emotivism of A. J. Ayer and 
C. L. Stevenson and prescriptivism of R. M. Hare. In general, they assert that moral principles are not based on 
facts and logic, but emotional attitudes and other subjective factors. For further discussion, see Hodgson (2001) 
and Putnam (2002, Chapter 4). 
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neutrality constitute two omnipresent elements which are ingrained throughout the 
discipline. By this view, despite its popularity, the normative/positive distinction, even 
if properly considered, is of no direct relevance with respect to the dual identity of 
economics. It can, therefore, be argued that the dominant perspective based on this 
conceptual scheme, namely the aforementioned pseudo dualist view, simply misses 
the point and offers more illusion than illumination to the topic. 
    
Table 2: Implications of Normative/Positive Distinction  
Branches\ Functions Description Explanation Prescription 
Positive economics Typically, economic enquiries 
neither start with observing 
behavior and generalizing 
behavioral laws, nor end with 
that. 
Explaining with the 
help of the rationality 
principle; no change 
made in means and end 
of the economic agents 
facing decision 
problems. 
- 
Normative economics - Making changes in  
means and end of the 
agents facing decision 
problems; no change in 
means and end involved in 
policy objectives and 
options. 
 
4. Economics as a moral science  
Departing from the normative/positive division, in what follows we will argue 
that the dual identity of economics – both as a moral science and a value-neutral 
approach – is nothing but an implication of the analytical feature of the discipline as a 
broadly-defined rational choice theory. Let us begin with its moral dimension, which 
has been reignited in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis14. 
The first argument for economics as a moral science is fairly straightforward: the 
ends motivating the behavior of economic agents reflect their ethical positions about 
the goals, desires, preferences, and other value concerns. In particular, from an 
economic point of view, the sense of sympathy, feeling of fairness, religious beliefs, 
and other nonmaterial factors all serve as the components of the thing – called utility 
or by other names – which agents seek to maximize. Notably, some may be unaware 
that the neoclassical hypothesis about utility is indeed also a value-laden assumption 
                                                        
14 In fact, ethics-related economic issues, especially distributive justice, business ethics, and the relationship 
between efficiency and equity, have come to the center of the post-crisis theoretical rethinking. See, among others, 
Posner, 2009, Atkinson, 2011, Bhagwati, 2011, Friedman, 2011, Shiller and Shiller, 2011, Stiglitz, 2012, Mankiw, 
2013, and Piketty, 2013. 
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in itself: it basically says that economic agents are only concerned with their own 
material welfare, such as consumption, profit, wage, and other monetary payoff.  
Second, apart from ends, few notice that some ethical concerns and principles 
also take the form of moral constraints to human conduct. Generally speaking, the 
latter refer to the factors that prevent economic agents from making the choices which 
are believed as morally wrong, even if these choices can yield a higher degree of 
utility, judged from one perspective or another. In this regard, it is particularly 
noteworthy that the “commitment” proposed by Sen (1977), which does not help the 
pursuit of one’s utility, can be understood as a moral constraint of this kind, rather 
than a counterexample to rational choice. The reason for that is quite unequivocal: 
according to our arguments in Section 2, if a relevant factor is assumed not to affect 
the end of economic agents’ behavior, or, equivalently, not to enter into their utility 
function, it should necessarily enter into the set of constraints facing them. Otherwise, 
this factor is no longer of relevance for explaining or understanding the agents’ 
behavior. Once again, it is not an empirical matter but a logic derivation from the 
economic way of thinking. It seems, however, that Sen himself did not realize what 
the concept of “commitment” would imply if taking the perspective of the rationality 
principle.  
Third, another less-considered moral aspect of economics lies in its expansion 
into the traditional domain of ethics. In fact, following the pioneering efforts of Gary 
Becker and other brilliant economists (see, inter alia, Becker, 1976, 1996; Stigler and 
Becker, 1977; Hirshleifer, 1985), this research line — under the heading of “economic 
imperialism” — has been using the language of constrained maximization to provide 
powerful explanations for a wide range of value-laden behavior and moral phenomena, 
including altruistic behavior, discrimination, prejudice, crime, addiction, religion, 
tradition, and social norms (for reviews of literature, see Raditzky and Berholz, 1987, 
and Lazear, 2000). In particular, much of the focus has been put on the emergence, 
survival, and fading of tastes/preferences and behavioral constraints in relation to the 
relevant social and natural conditions. It is important to note that in doing so, 
economic “imperialists” no longer stick to the maxim “de gustibus non est 
disputandum,”15 but instead account for or endogenize various moral factors in terms 
of individual rational behavior.  
Fourth and lastly, as argued in Section 3, non-epistemic or ethical values are 
omnipresent in policy discussions or the “normative economics of prescription.” 
Below we will not restate our previous arguments, but add a point regarding epistemic 
values, albeit the latter are not our main focus. Since what economists can do about 
real-life decision making is to mend the preferences, desires, tastes, and constraints of 
                                                        
15 Namely, there is no arguing about tastes. 
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the agents who face decision problems, their “science” should not stay “dismal.” 
Instead, it should turn out to be some sort of informative or persuasive advertising, or 
even “preaching” as put by Stigler (1980) 16 , which is required to be, say, 
easy-to-understand, appealing, attractive, convincing, and etc. It is these features that 
make economics — especially when it is to do with policy prescriptions — laden with 
epistemic values. Unfortunately, this point, which is equally derived from the 
economic way of thinking, attracts little attention from the existing literature, 
especially from Putnam and Walsh’s related discussions (Putnam, 2002, Putnam and 
Walsh, 2007 and 2009; also see Section 1).  
 
5. Economics as a value-neutral science 
The close interlink between economics and ethics is, however, not at odds with 
the discipline’s value neutrality, or its engineering-like feature. As the rationality 
principle implies, economic enquiries should be necessarily based on some premises 
on means-end considerations. It is obvious that once these premises are given 
beforehand as explanantia, their moral rightness or wrongness has been put beyond 
discussion. However, as previously stressed in Section 2, there is no logical reason to 
prevent the latter from being the objects of other enquires (namely as explananda), 
either within or without the field of economics.   
To better articulate our thoughts, let us look at two societies, a and b. Society a is 
highly unequal in terms of income distribution but even the poorest person there can 
make 5000 dollars each year. Society b is composed of individuals with equal annual 
income, say 4000 dollars. Then, if an economist is asked a question like “keeping 
other things constant, which society is better for me?” The most likely answer would 
be: “It all depends on your value criteria.” If a bigger (smaller, respectively) enough 
weight is given to the absolute income than to the desire for equality in the asker’s 
utility function, society a (society b) will be the better choice. Or, if the asker takes a 
moral commitment to choose a more equal society, regardless of his/her own material 
situation17, there will be no other choice than going to society b subject to this 
behavioral constraint — since in this case the choice for society a is already excluded. 
In this view, economic approach remains completely neutral regarding the asker’s 
moral positions. 
A second example may help to further illustrate our claim. When we ask “what is 
                                                        
16 Notably, in taking a narrowly-defined utility-maximization perspective, Stigler (1980) argued that “(s)ocial 
policies and institutions, not individual behavior, are the proper object of the economist-preacher's solicitude” 
(p.150). We take issue with this claim by pointing out that with no exception, all policies and institutions are 
made by individuals or by individual maximizers. Thus, economists should change those individuals’ behavior 
otherwise economic theory “would become irrelevant” (p.150). 
17 “Commitment” is as described in Sen (1977); also see Section 4 of this paper. 
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the optimal Gini coefficient for a society?” logically, it is always followed by another 
question like “optimal in which sense?” There are surely a number of candidate 
criteria. For instance, a certain level of Gini coefficient can be seen as optimal in the 
sense that other things being equal, it can lead to the highest economic growth rate, or 
to longest average life expectancy, or to lowest crime rate, etc. But how should we 
choose and weight these different criteria of optimality? Obviously, to tackle this new 
question, we further need an a priori criterion that allows the comparison of these 
candidates. Then, the latter should be reduced to some intermediary or instrumental 
ends to achieve a single intrinsic end of higher order (also see Footnote 5). In other 
words, some common metric is needed to measure those candidate criteria or 
intermediary ends, thereby making the comparison possible. Yet, there is a cautionary 
note that any particular end, like desire for equality, should not always be taken as 
ultimate or intrinsic in itself. The reasoning above would indeed continue until the 
investigators are, more or less reluctantly, satisfied with certain kinds of free argument. 
The latter may be borrowed from other disciplines including ethics, or even be given 
arbitrarily.  
Unfortunately, in the relevant literature, value neutrality of economics has been 
widely misinterpreted as an argument that the formations of tastes, preferences and 
values, are always put beyond question by economists. For example, Kenneth 
Boulding (1969) once mentioned an illusion called the “Immaculate Conception of 
the indifference curve.” By that term, Boulding referred to the belief shared by some 
economists that the tastes of economic agents are simply given and the question of 
how they are formed is beyond the scope of economics. In our view, Boulding’s irony 
is not entirely irrelevant, but our attitudes toward it are mixed. On the one hand, 
following Boulding’s proposition, we assert that economists have plenty of analytical 
tools to enquire into the process of the taste/preference/value/norm formation in order 
to deal with questions like “why does an indifference curve look like this rather than 
like that?” Indeed, as achieved by the economics imperialism literature, the 
applications of economic approach have yielded insights of scholarly and practical 
value to various ethical issues. On the other hand, however, economics cannot start 
with nothing but necessarily with some presuppositions about goals and constraints, 
which, from an economic point of view, frame human conduct. These presuppositions 
should be taken for granted, or, to use Boulding’s words, should be “immaculately 
conceived.” In economic enquiries, they indeed play a role as the first mover that gets 
the ball rolling (also see Hausman, 2012, Chapter 6).  
Accordingly, in light of the analogy of the first mover, it turns out that economics 
remains a neutral instrument to explore the consequences and implications of certain 
moral premises and value criteria given beforehand, regardless whether they are 
morally justified by the economists who draw on them. This leads to a related 
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question: can economists ultimately answer what are the morally right premises? 
Based on what has been argued previously, our response should be negative. The 
reason is that in order to judge these premises we always need other criteria of 
judgment and theories of justice. Hence, it turns out that this kind of justification will, 
as mentioned in Section 3, either go beyond the scope of economics at some point, or 
become an infinite regress problem. This question further brings us to the purpose of 
economics. Although perhaps no one would argue about Pigou’s view that economics 
is for “the bettering of human life” (Pigou, 1920, p. vii), its identity as a value-free 
technique implies that we cannot know this purpose by solely doing economics, just 
like we cannot know the purpose of physics by solely doing physics. Why we do 
those two disciplines is indeed a metaphysical question that is beyond the scope of 
economics and physics. In this light, if economics is used for some purposes which 
are commonly believed as unethical — for example, designing an intentional inflation 
to steal people’s savings, the discipline per se is not to blame for that.  
By adding these points we touch upon the epistemological limitation of the 
economic way of thinking. In short, economists cannot know the moral significance 
underlying both human conduct and even their own subject, unless some moral 
premises are given to them for free. Here, we hasten to stress that just like every 
scientific discipline – including natural sciences which rely also on some a priori  
principles, axioms, or the “ultimate given” (such as the assumption of the existence of 
physical laws), economics is not an exception. More important, the recognition of this 
kind of limit of knowing or professional incompetence due to the division of 
theoretical labor is not a shame but a good starting point for a call-for-collaboration 
with other disciplines, especially ethics.    
   
6. Conclusions 
For centuries, although it is widely recognized that economics is closely entwined 
with both ethics and engineering, many, if not most, economists believe that these two 
mutually exclusive approaches cannot be used together for featuring the discipline. 
With this understanding, they are inclined to draw a sharp dichotomy between the two 
facets of economics − as a moral science and as a value-neutral technique, and relate 
them to normative and positive economics, respectively. In our view, however, this 
common perspective rests on disregarding the fundamental logic of economics. The 
latter can be summarized as explaining and theorizing human behavior through the 
lens of the rationality principle — taken in its broader sense.  
It is important to emphasize that holding this principle is not for the need of 
realism, and thus empirical justification for it is of no relevance; nor is it for 
mathematical convenience, and thus it holds regardless of whether formal 
optimization techniques are used. Instead, the rationality principle just serves as an a 
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priori common grammar of economic analysis that defines how economists explain 
their subject-matter and what they can do to improve the real-life situation. 
Specifically, on the one hand, no matter what analytical tools and behavioral 
assumptions are taken, the choices and tradeoffs of economic agents can be explained 
by economists if and only if they are reduced to the outcomes of means-end 
considerations of some kinds; likewise, social norms, institutions, and market 
relationships can be explained if and only if they are reduced to the outcomes of the 
choices and interactions of these rational agents. On the other hand, economists can 
offer effective policy prescriptions if and only if they can make changes in the 
means-end considerations of the decision makers in question. 
Being aware of this common grammar leads us to the reconciliation of morality 
with value neutrality in economics, without slicing the discipline into two branches. 
However different these two elements appear, they are indeed two sides of the same 
coin, instead of two parts making the coin! On the one hand, economics is a moral 
science not only because all theorizing and policy discussions in economics are 
necessarily based on certain moral premises about the means-end scheme of the 
agents; it is also because economists have provided, from the standpoint of their 
discipline, explanations for a wide range of moral issues, including the formations of 
tastes and social norms. On the other hand, economics remains neutral regarding 
judgmental positions and value systems. This is because, without ethical 
presuppositions, economists cannot judge and evaluate the human choices in which 
different ultimate value criteria or ends are involved.  
Finally, some may still be reluctant to accept the dualist view that economics 
exhibits the properties of both moral science and value-neutral approach, regardless of 
the normative-positive distinction. To a large extent, this avenue of understanding is 
reminiscent of the long struggle with the duality paradox of light. Today, the latter is 
no longer paradoxical for most, if not all, physicists, because quantum mechanics tells 
us that light behaves both as a wave and as a particle, rather than a part of light 
behaves as a wave, and another part behaves as a particle. In light of light, there is 
nothing conceptually paradoxical that economics, as its methodological heartland 
implies, behaves both as a moral science and as a value-neutral technique at the same 
time.  
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